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Abstract: For over two decades the US has funded repressive forced coca eradication in Peru, 
Colombia and Bolivia to reduce the illegal cocaine trade.  These policies have never met their 
stated goals and have generated violence and poverty. In 2006 Bolivia definitively broke with 
the US anti-narcotics model, replacing the militarized eradication of coca crops with a 
community-based coca control strategy. The program substantially reduced the coca crop 
while providing subsistence and citizenship for farmers and respecting human rights. This 
article outlines the elements of the Bolivian initiative that ensure its functioning and considers 
to what extent they can be translated to other contexts. More broadly this paper draws 
attention to the fundamental inability of supply side control initiatives to slow the illegal drug 
trade, which is driven by continuing demand and exorbitant profits. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Since the launch of the Andean Initiative in 19893 the US has channelled billions of 
dollars to South American military and police forces to enable them to undertake 
counter-narcotics operations. In the Andean region the US has focused its efforts on 
the eradication of illicit crops (mostly coca leaf -which is used to produce cocaine - 
but also opium poppy and marijuana), law enforcement and the interdiction of drugs 
shipments. The aim of ‘supply side enforcement’ is to curb the flow of illicit narcotics 
reaching the United States. The logic underlying the entire operation is that by 
reducing supply, the cost of illicit drugs will increase, and this in turn will dissuade 
people in consumer countries from buying them (Youngers, 2006).   
  Historically, the USA has dictated the terms of the ‘war on drugs’, and has 
used its political and economic might to crush any debate on alternatives. However, 
recently some Latin American leaders have openly discussed the failure of present 	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3 The Andean Initiative was a five-year, US $2,200m. plan targeting coca and cocaine production in the Andean region; the plan 
was ‘front-loaded’ with military and police assistance. 
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policies to achieve their goals and the high cost of implementing supply reduction 
efforts (in terms of violence, corruption and institutional instability).  Latin American 
leaders have argued for more effective and humane alternatives, some countries have 
even made unilateral changes to drugs policy (see Grisaffi, 2014b).4 This article adds 
to the debate through a discussion of illicit coca cultivation and the policies to tackle 
it, in Peru, Colombia and Bolivia. This article represents a timely intervention as, of 
late, debate challenging mainstream forced eradication as an integral part of counter-
drug initiatives, has dropped off the drug policy radar.  
This article draws attention to the harms generated by US backed militarized 
eradication and the aerial fumigation of coca crops, and explains why this policy 
ultimately fails to stem coca and cocaine production. The second half of the article 
introduces Bolivia’s innovative model for coca control which allows registered 
farmers to grow a limited amount of coca, while working with coca grower 
federations and units of the security forces to voluntarily reduce any excess coca 
production - a process known as ‘social control’. It is argued that ‘social control’ 
represents a more humane, sustainable and productive alternative to the forced 
eradication of coca crops. In the final section the authors examine the elements of the 
Bolivian initiative that permit its continued productive implementation and explore 
their potential applicability to other Andean contexts.  
More broadly this paper draws attention to the fundamental inability of supply 
side control initiatives to slow the illegal drug trade, which is driven by continuing 
demand and exorbitant profits. Raw materials and drug production sites are 
eliminated but are quickly and easily reinitiated elsewhere.  Traffickers effortlessly 
absorb these operating costs, and military and police budgets retain high levels of 
funding.  Yet, impoverished communities growing coca or participating in the lowest 
levels of the drug trade fare much worse. What supply-side drug control, specifically 
forced coca eradication, does achieve however, is of even greater concern; namely 
poverty, human rights violations and the erosion of civilian state legitimacy and 
control. In sum, supply side control generates unacceptably high human costs with no 
apparent benefits to any party negatively affected by the drug trade.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In December 2013 Uruguay became the first country in the world to legalise and regulate the production, marketing and 
consumption of cannabis. 
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2 Coca Regulation 
 
Coca is a perennial shrub native to the Andean region; it grows like a weed in tropical 
areas at elevations of between 200 to 1500 meters. Coca leaf has been used for 
millennia by indigenous peoples in the Andean countries; it is most commonly 
chewed but it can also be prepared as a tea. The people who consume coca value its 
properties as a mild stimulant, but it also serves important social, religious and 
cultural functions (Allen, 1988, Carter and Mamani, 1986). Academic research 
confirms that coca use has no harmful impact on the consumer (Burchard, 1992). 
Despite its many positive benefits (not to mention the coca trade’s historic 
importance to the regional economy), the leaf has always occupied an ambiguous 
position in Andean society. Since the Spanish conquest activists, law-makers, 
scholars, and the clergy have debated the legality of coca and its derivative products 
(Gagliano, 1994, Gootenberg, 2008).  In 1961 coca leaf was classified as a restricted 
narcotic substance (alongside cocaine and heroin) under the UN Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs. The convention – which was signed by Peru, Colombia and Bolivia –
establishes that ‘the parties shall so far as possible enforce the uprooting of all coca 
bushes which grow wild. They shall destroy the coca bushes if illegally cultivated,’ 
and, ‘coca leaf chewing must be abolished within twenty-five years’ (Metaal et al., 
2006). The 1961 convention thus established the legal framework for future US 
backed coca eradication efforts.  
Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia each have unique histories, cultures and 
traditions related to coca, and as a result each nation pursues a different approach to 
enforcement. Colombia penalizes coca most severely; all aspects of production, 
consumption and commercialization are outlawed. Colombia’s harsh stance can be 
traced to the fact that Colombia has comparatively limited traditional consumption,5 
and so unlike in Peru and Bolivia there is no widespread support for it (Ramirez 211: 
55). Furthermore, in Colombia revenues derived from the illegal coca trade have 
fuelled the country’s interminable civil conflict. Successive governments have 
criminalized coca growers on the basis that they finance terrorism (Rangel, 2000, 
Peceny and Durnan, 2006, Thoumi, 2002). The Colombian state has long embraced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In Colombia coca has traditionally been used by some indigenous peoples, however as they represent a very small segment of 
Colombia’s population (around 3%) coca use is very restricted.  
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U.S. designed and funded anti-drug strategies, although recently its leaders have 
started to question the sustainability of this approach.  
In Peru coca consumption is common in highland areas– particularly amongst 
rural populations - but it is also consumed by middle class urban professionals and 
served to tourists in Cusco to help them cope with the altitude. Peru’s coca legislation 
is less rigid than Colombia’s, because while the state officially condemns coca 
chewing and prohibits private coca cultivation, it nevertheless authorizes limited coca 
production and commercialization for medicinal, scientific and industrial purposes.6 
Peru is a recipient of large amounts of US counter-drug aid, and has ambitious plans 
to eradicate half the country’s coca crop over the coming years (Gootenberg, 2014).  
Bolivia has the strongest coca culture of all the Andean countries. A recent EU 
funded study calculated that about one third of Bolivia’s population regularly 
consumes coca or coca based products, including coca teas, skin creams, and liquor 
(CONALTID, 2013b). Bolivian President Evo Morales has also led the battle for the 
decriminalization of coca leaf at the international level, arguing that the ban on 
traditional use is not only a historic mistake,7 but also discriminatory towards Andean 
peoples. In an unprecedented move, in 2011 Bolivia withdrew from the 1961 UN 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and re-joined in 2013, with a reservation that 
permits coca consumption within its territory. Bolivia thus successfully reconciled its 
international commitments and its 2009 Constitution, which declares that the state has 
a duty to preserve and protect coca chewing as an ancestral practice.  
 
3 Coca Cultivation  
 
Peru, Colombia and Bolivia are the world’s largest producers of coca leaf. The most 
recent UN coca surveys estimate that Peru has 60,400 hectares of coca (UNODC, 
2014c), Colombia 48,000 hectares (UNODC, 2014a), and Bolivia 23,000 hectares 
(UNODC, 2014b). In each country coca cultivation is concentrated in marginal areas, 
characterized by minimal civilian state presence, limited infrastructure and high rates 
of poverty (UNODC, 2005). In this context coca complements subsistence farming 
and, in the absence of other income generating activities, is one of the few pursuits 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 All legal coca in Peru is commercialized through the state run National Coca Company (ENACO by its Spanish acronymn). 
7 The justification for classifying coca as an illegal substance has its roots in a UN study published in 1950. This study has since 
been discredited as inaccurate and racist for its characterization of coca chewing as a disgusting, backward and dangerous habit.  
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that provides farmers with access to cash. This is well illustrated in the case of 
Colombia where sixty per cent of coca is grown on plots measuring less than two 
hectares, and the majority of farmers live below the poverty line (Díaz and Sánchez, 
2004).  
Small-scale farmers grow coca because it has several comparative advantages 
as a cash crop. Coca can be harvested once every three to four months, it is light and 
easy to transport and almost all of the investment corresponds to labour costs and not 
to tools or other inputs, which leads to elevated levels of employment. Coca leaf 
generates far higher returns per hectare than any other crop, but most importantly 
there is always a guaranteed market for it (Spedding, 2004). Given the lack of legal 
alternatives and the high prices, much of the coca crop is sold to traffickers who 
process it into cocaine paste (the first step towards refining pure cocaine). The people 
who process cocaine paste are generally young men with no land or hope of decent 
jobs. They set up artisanal laboratories in isolated areas, where they macerate 
shredded coca leaves in a range of chemicals including sulfuric acid and gasoline to 
extract the cocaine alkaloid. The drug workers earn low wages for work that is 
dangerous, illegal and harmful to their health (Grisaffi, 2014a). 
While coca cultivation has provided small farmers with economic 
opportunities, its cultivation is also associated with a range of negative environmental 
and social impacts.  Environmentalists argue that as coca is grown in isolated areas it 
expands the agricultural frontier and contributes to significant deforestation. For 
example it is calculated that in Peru, 2.5 million hectares of forest have been 
destroyed as a result of coca cultivation (Briones et al., 2013: 33). Furthermore the 
chemicals used to process cocaine paste, including gasoline and sulphuric acid, are 
often released into streams and rivers, and in the process damage delicate aquatic 
ecosystems (Young, 2004, Alvarez, 2001, Salisbury and Fagan, 2013). These impacts 
are real, but they are not restricted to coca farming, we might expect similar results if 
colonization was provoked by gold mining, logging or ranching. Indeed, several 
studies have found that if farmers were to plant lower value legal crops then they 
would have to clear even larger areas of forest in order to maintain household 
incomes (Henkel, 1995, Bradley and Millington, 2008). Meanwhile, the methods to 
reduce coca plantations, including the aerial spraying of herbicides in Colombia, may 
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prove to be even more destructive to ecologically sensitive environments than drug 
processing (O'Shaughnessy and Branford, 2005).  
Researchers also point to the negative social impacts of spontaneous 
colonization. Highland migrants to tropical areas, are portrayed in some of the 
literature as invading indigenous territories and establishing boom towns plagued by 
lawlessness and violence (Salisbury and Fagan, 2013). The most serious social harm 
related to coca cultivation can be observed in Colombia, where the major guerrilla 
groups, including the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC by its Spanish 
acronym) and right wing paramilitaries, finance their activities by taxing coca 
production and trafficking. Farmers have been caught in the crossfire as illegal armed 
groups struggle for control over this lucrative trade (Angrist and Kugler, 2008, Ibáñez 
and Eduardo Vélez, 2008). The intense violence, has forced tens of thousands of 
people off their land to join the ranks of Colombia’s estimated 4.9 to 5.5 million 
internally displaced people (IDMC, 2013). Research on Peru’s Shining Path Maoist 
guerrilla movement, also shows that access to the coca economy was a key 
determinant allowing it to expand (Kernaghan, 2009, Felbab-Brown, 2005) 
 
4 Forced eradication 
 
A cornerstone of US strategy in the Andean region has been the eradication of coca 
crops. Eradication is often carried out manually, teams of eradicators (often military 
conscripts) accompanied by heavily armed members of the police enter small 
farmsteads to uproot illicit crops. Chemical eradication has also been used; typically 
herbicides are sprayed from small aircraft so that larger areas of coca can be 
destroyed. Colombia is currently the only Andean country to allow aerial fumigation 
(Mansfield, 2011). Crop eradication counts on strong support among US 
policymakers who claim that it is the most sure-fire way to cut drug production; from 
their perspective, crop destruction at the source prevents them from being processed 
into drugs and subsequently traded on the international market (Dion and Russler, 
2008: 402). However, there is a growing body of research, which indicates that supply 
side enforcement  – in particular crop eradication - does not meet its targets and 
generates wide ranging harmful impacts (see Reuter, 2001).  
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Analysts point out that eradicating coca crops is grossly inefficient. 
Eradication generates incentives for poor farmers to replant as it forces the price of 
coca up, while simultaneously denying them their only source of income. Thus when 
crops are reduced in one area, production inevitably expands in other geographic 
locations; a phenomenon analysts refer to as the ‘balloon effect’ (Rouse and Arce, 
2006). For example as a result of forced eradication in Peru and Bolivia in the early 
1990s production shifted to Colombia, which in 2009 became the worlds foremost 
producer of raw coca leaf. Consequently, although the amount of land under coca 
cultivation in each country fluctuated between 1987 and 2008, the total coca acreage 
in the Andean region as a whole remained remarkably stable, at around 190,000 
hectares (Youngers and Walsh, 2010: 3).  
Since 2009 UNODC data shows that overall coca crop acreage has decreased 
(mostly driven down by efforts in Colombia), but this has had no obvious effect on 
drug production nor has it had a discernable impact on the supply of drugs reaching 
consumer markets. The problem stems from the flexibility at the supply side. Farmers 
have found ways to protect their crops from herbicides, and to generate higher yields 
per hectare by increasing the density of coca plants and using new combinations of 
fertilizer and pesticides. Meanwhile cocaine paste manufactures have employed new 
technologies and processes to extract more cocaine from lower volumes of coca leaf. 
As a result, in spite of eradication efforts, potential cocaine production in the Andes 
has remained virtually unchanged (Mejia, 2010, Mejia and Posada, 2008).  
Aside from being inefficient, eradication puts the burden of the war on drugs 
onto small farmers (who gain the least from the trade) and generates multiple harms.  
Forced eradication (when no alternative livelihood strategies are in place), 
immediately wipes out the family’s main source of income, leaving them destitute and 
struggling to survive.  Eradication also imperils targeted growers and their 
communities by orientating the military towards internal enemies, often leading to the 
violation of human rights. In all three countries the security forces tasked with 
carrying out eradication missions have killed, abused and seriously wounded scores of 
coca farmers, torched homesteads and incarcerated and tortured hundreds of people. 
Institutional damage has been compounded by the impunity that the security forces 
frequently enjoy (Youngers and Rosin, 2005).   
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The aerial fumigation of coca crops in Colombia brings with it a specific set of 
problems. Since the inauguration of Plan Colombia in 2000,8 the government has 
sprayed more than half a million hectares with herbicide (Ramirez and Youngers, 
2011). The government has always argued that the chemicals used to spray coca are 
benign, however Anthropologist, Maria Clemencia Ramirez (2011) records how 
people who live in spray zones suffer from a variety of ailments including skin, 
respiratory and gastrointestinal problems. They also complain that spraying is 
indiscriminate and carried out without warning. The herbicides have caused 
environmental damage (including water contamination and land degradation) and 
have affected food and cash crops, which in turn has undermined food security. Given 
that most farmers have no other way to survive they often end up replanting coca 
deeper in the jungle, thus all that spraying achieves is to displace coca cultivation and 
with it spread the civil conflict to new areas (Rincon-Ruiz and Kallis, 2013, Walsh et 
al., 2008, Dion and Russler, 2008). The Colombian Government acknowledges the 
poor results of fumigation, in 2007 it downscaled crop spraying and stepped up 
manual eradication missions, which contributed to driving down coca cultivation 
(Isacson, 2010). 
Eradicating crops is not only inefficient and dangerous but it is also 
counterproductive. Forced coca eradication sews distrust amongst coca grower 
communities and thus undermines the functioning of alternative development 
programs (Melis and Nougier, 2010). What is more, the eradication of crops has 
provoked political instability in the Andean countries. In Peru and Colombia peasants 
have held national level protests to campaign against coca eradication and in both 
countries illegal armed actors (Sendero Luminoso in Peru and the FARC in 
Colombia) have, on occasion, sided with coca growers to resist government 
eradication efforts (Ramirez, 2011, Kernaghan, 2009, Felbab-Brown, 2005). 
Meanwhile in Bolivia, US backed coca eradication was a catalyst for mass discontent 
and demonstrations that toppled two presidents, in 2003 and again in 2005 (Grisaffi, 
2010, Durand Ochoa, 2014).  
 
5 The myth of “alternative” development 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In 2000 the US and Colombia jointly launched Plan Colombia, an eight-billion dollar ‘aid’ package (80% of which is destined 
for the police and military) with the stated aim to reduce narcotics production by half within six years and to regain security in 
the country.  
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While funding crop eradication campaigns, the US has also provided coca farmers 
with development assistance with the aim to convince them to switch to legal crops. 
Anthropological research suggests that coca farmers would like to reduce their 
dependence on coca (Ramirez, 2011), however, with few exceptions such projects 
have failed to offer them realistic economic alternatives.  An examination of US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) designed and funded programs in the 
Chapare, one of Bolivia’s principal coca growing regions, between 1997 and 2003, 
illuminates some of the limitations of ‘alternative development’.  
USAID promoted export crops, such as bananas, coffee, cacao, palm heart, 
and timber, none of which are suitable for the small peasant producer. Crops such as 
bananas and palm heart require a large initial investment, a sizeable workforce and 
large tracts of land in order to be profitable. Meanwhile coffee and cocoa beans take a 
long time to mature so dividends only appear after several years (thus many farmers 
went bust in the intervening period). USAID did not carry out viability studies to see 
if there were markets for these products, and made little effort to open out new 
markets. Thus most farmers found that they could not sell their ‘alternative’ crops and 
they were pushed into debt as they had to repay loans they had been encouraged to 
take out in order to plant the crops in the first place. The failure of such projects 
meant that many farmers were forced to replant coca (Farthing and Kohl, 2005, Lupu, 
2004). 
US Development budgets for the Chapare were high, with estimates ranging 
from US$229 to $310 million spent between the beginning of the 1980s until 2004  
(Farthing and Kohl, 2005: 186). However, most of the money went to USAID 
contractors (to be spent on wages, hotels, cars and offices), rather than to the intended 
beneficiaries, a situation which generated resentment amongst coca farmers. Further,  
USAID refused to work with the existing agricultural unions (henceforth referred to 
as the Coca Federations), or even the municipal governments (which since 1995 had 
been under the control of the Coca Federations)9. From 1998 farmers who wanted to 
acquire development assistance first had to cut their ties with the Coca Federations 
and join one of the USAID backed producers associations. Associacionistas, as they 
came to be known, had to commit that they would no longer grow coca and denounce 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 After 2004 USAID began to work with municipal governments in the Chapare. 
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neighbours who continued to do so. Many coca growers saw this as an attempt by 
USAID to break the coca federations through a process of divide and rule, as one 
Federation leader put it ‘we realized that the Yankees were trying to make us fight 
between comrades.’ Others said ‘the NGOs came here to destroy the unions’. In 2008 
the Coca Federations refused to permit any further USAID alternative development 
projects in the Chapare.  
In Peru and Colombia the government, donor agencies, and development 
contractors have replicated failed initiatives in Bolivia with little variation. In both 
countries there has been a lack of meaningful consultation with peasants’ 
organizations, poor sequencing of development assistance (i.e. making it dependent 
on the prior eradication of coca), short-term planning, and the promotion of crops 
aimed at the export market, which have proved to be unsuitable as there were often no 
markets for them (UNODC 2005). USAID’s emphasis on promoting private 
agribusiness has had a range of harmful impacts including generating few jobs at low 
wages, damaging ecologically sensitive environments and encouraging the 
concentration of land ownership, thus contributing to rising levels of inequality 
(Cabieses, 2010, Vargas, 2011, Youngers and Walsh, 2010, Mansfield, 2011). In 
Colombia this development model has exacerbated processes of accumulation by 
dispossession; with paramilitaries forcing peasants from their land to allow for the 
expansion of agro-industry (Hristov, 2009, Ballvé, 2013, Escobar, 2003).  
As coca growers have long known, no sole source of income will replace coca, 
especially in fragile tropical environments with poor infrastructure and minimum state 
presence. As a result, crop “substitution” and “alternative” constitute two of the 
fundamental myths presented as justification for forced eradication, and their 
inevitable failure guarantees endless cycles of repression, poverty, and replanting the 
coca leaf. It is essential that policymakers move beyond this spurious, yet pernicious, 
precept.   
 
6 Bolivian community coca control 
 
The negative impacts of inefficient and ultimately, counter-productive, US-promoted 
forced coca eradication have been thoroughly documented. This begs the question, 
what would a different approach look like?  This section outlines Bolivia’s radical 
Paper presented at ‘Insecure Spaces in Latin America: Encounters with Violence and Drugs’ 
Workshop - University of Oxford. 27th November 2014 
	   	  
	  	  
new strategy to coca control, which coordinated integrated development and limited 
coca cultivation, with the aim to reduce harms to coca growing communities.  
The death of two coca growers at the hands of government eradication forces 
in October 2004 (just weeks after a negative evaluation of Bolivian eradication efforts 
by the US government) sparked massive social unrest in the Chapare region of 
Bolivia. To calm the growing tension the Mesa administration (2003-2005) accepted a 
longstanding demand of Chapare coca growers, the right for each family to cultivate a 
small plot of coca, or ‘cato’ (1600 square meters), destined for the licit market.  The 
concession, which flew in the face of US eradication mandates, effectively ended 
forced eradication in the region. The initiative marked a shift in vision away from the 
US imposed narrative, which portrayed coca farmers as active participants in the drug 
trade, to subsistence farmers working to feed their families.   
With the launch of the cato policy, protests, violence, and human rights 
violations subsided immediately. Union members went from staunch resistance to the 
government, to active citizen participants, working to limit their crop to one cato per 
union member.  The underlying logic of the program helped to guarantee its success, 
the equitable distribution of the small plots of coca among established union families, 
effectively increased leaf prices, and provided each family with the equivalent of a 
monthly minimum wage.  
The ‘cato accord’ was initially designed as a temporary measure,10 however on 
entering office in 2006 President Evo Morales (an ex-coca grower) adopted the cato 
system as the cornerstone of his coca control strategy and extended it to other coca 
growing regions, including the La Paz Yungas.  Morales also increased the previous 
cap on coca cultivation from 12,000 to 20,000 hectares nationally.11 With funding 
from the European Union, the Morales administration designed and implemented a 
complex, overlapping multi-faceted strategy to support the project.  The six pillars 
include: 
 
1. Land titling for coca growing families with catos.12  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The terms of the October 2004 accord stipulated that the cato policy and coca distribution would be re-evaluated after the 
publication of a broad-based legal market study. Publication of  long-awaited study occurred in October 2013. 
11 The administration’s justification for extending the amount of land under coca cultivation is that coca, in its natural state, is not 
a drug.  
12 Coca growers had long resisted state land titling initiatives in the past for fear of expropriation for growing coca and erosion of 
sindicato control. 
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2. Biometric registry of coca growers authorized to grow the cato.  
3. The registration and recurring measurement of each cato of coca by the state 
monitoring organization, the Economic and Social Development Unit 
(UDESTRO by its Spanish acronym).13  
4. The creation and maintenance of a sophisticated database (SYSCOCA), which 
aids the monitoring of coca cultivation and traces coca leaf transport and sales. 
5. Integrated development projects to complement subsistence income generated 
by the cato. 
6. The empowerment of the community to self-police to restrict coca cultivation 
to the one cato limit. This includes training for union representatives on 
database use, and community joint action to monitor and restrict coca planting. 
 
This innovative program did not emerge overnight, but rather was built on the 
previous efforts of the Coca Federations and the European Union’s (PRAEDAC) 
municipal strengthening program.14 Initiated in 1998 (during the peak of US-driven 
forced eradication) the landmark EU initiative functioned on the premise that poverty 
reduction (through providing basic services), engaging coca grower organizations, 
land titling and strengthening local government, can contribute to break farmers’ 
reliance on coca. Nicolaus Hansmann, attaché to the Cooperation Section of the 
European Union in Bolivia, told the authors that beyond its concrete on the ground 
achievements, one of PRAEDAC’s most significant contributions was to change the 
image of alternative development and to build trust in government and legitimate the 
state in the region.15 In other words, PRAEDAC created a credible foundation for 
community coca control. 
Building on this groundwork, once in power the MAS administration 
channelled development assistance to coca growing regions and increased state 
presence through investments in roads, schools and health posts with the aim to bring 
the region into the economic and social mainstream. In contrast to previous US-driven 
initiatives, these government led programs recognize the importance of restricted coca 
cultivation and the strategic advantage of working with the well-organized union 
structure. The Chapare farmers are making the most of these opportunities and are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Bolivia shares its coca data with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
14 See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/case-studies/bolivia_praedac_en.pdf 
15 Nicolaus Hansmann, EU. 11 november 2014, electronic communication 
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successfully diversifying their sources of income. In 2011 the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) noted that for the first time there had been a 
significant expansion of non-coca crops in the zone (UNODC, 2011: 47); even 
USAID echoed the sentiment (GAO, 2012: 17). Coca growers confirm that over the 
past nine years the regional economy has started to pick up, this is evidenced by rising 
land prices, home improvements and increased car and motorbike ownership. 
PRAEDAC’s initial efforts to strengthen Chapare local government and 
reduce poverty allowed for the successful transition of coca control agencies 
(previously funded and supervised by the US Narcotics Affairs Section) to be 
efficiently run by farmer representatives. The State offices that monitor the 
distribution of the coca crop and plan its reduction now integrate local civil society 
representatives into state institutions, further enhancing their legitimacy.  This 
credibility, first-hand knowledge of coca farming, rapport and capacity built through 
training and enhanced technology funded by the international community (EU, 
UNODC, US, and Brazil) has led to the development of transparent and efficient 
systems and guidelines that protect the subsistence rights of the farmer. The rules of 
the game are clearly defined and reached by consensus. 
The control initiative also demonstrates Bolivia’s commitment to address the 
international community’s concerns about coca cultivation for the illegal market. The 
Morales administration has made efforts to industrialize coca for licit uses, including 
setting up coca processing plants to manufacture coca tea in sachets along with a 
range of other products. However, for the meantime these plants run well below 
capacity because coca remains on the UN list of restricted substances, so these 
products cannot be legally exported  and the domestic legal market cannot soak up 
Bolivia’s current coca production. 16   
Today Bolivian government and UNODC monitoring teams are now able to 
accurately measure the coca crop and its distribution in situ. As a result, for the first 
time in any country, there is a consensus amongst major players and the international 
community about how much coca there is and where it can be found.17 The data 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 A EU funded study suggests that Bolivia needs 14,000 hectares to satisfy domestic consumption CONALTID (2013a) 
'Gobierno presenta resultados del Estudio Integral de la Hoja de Coca', Edicion Especial de la Secretaria de Coordinacion 
CONALTID. La Paz, Bolivia, Ministerio de Gobierno de Bolivia.. 
17 Coca data in Bolivia is now so accurate that in 2013 the United States government felt obliged to quietly downscale their own 
coca growing estimates for Bolivia during Morales’s tenure by an average of 5,000 hectares per year Andean Information 
Network (2013) 'ONDCP Dramatically Downscales Potential Cocaine Produciton Estimates for Bolivia', in Ledebur, K. (ed) AIN 
Policy Memo. Cochabamba, Andean Information Network. 
Paper presented at ‘Insecure Spaces in Latin America: Encounters with Violence and Drugs’ 
Workshop - University of Oxford. 27th November 2014 
	   	  
	  	  
shows that in 2010 the Bolivian coca crop stood at 31,000 hectares, but by 2013 it had 
declined to 23,000 hectares, less than half the coca found in either Peru or Colombia 
(UNODC 2014). Significantly, Bolivia has dramatically reduced its coca supply while 
respecting new benchmarks for success, including respect for human rights, full 
citizenship rights for farmers, empowering local communities, and developing long-
term economic alternatives to coca. Undoubtedly, a negotiated approach like 
Bolivia’s community coca control, will take longer to show results than forced 
eradication, yet, coca reduction under the new system can be more readily sustained 
as farmers are provided with real economic alternatives.  
 
6.1 How community coca control works on the ground 
 
In the past policy makers viewed Bolivia’s coca grower organizations as an 
impediment to coca control. In contrast today they are seen as key to the effective 
implementation of the cato policy and complementary development initiatives. 
Drawing on long term ethnographic research in the region, this section outlines how 
control is enacted on the ground by the agricultural federations. 
The Chapare region is characterised by strong agricultural unions. At the 
grassroots are the ‘sindicatos,’ these are territorially bound self-governing units 
composed of anything from 20 to 200 people.  The sindicatos are grouped into sub-
centrals, which in turn make up six federations representing more than 40,000 
families. In order to gain a cato each member of a sindicato has to acquire a land title, 
register for a bio-metric ID card and have their cato measured and logged by the state 
coca monitoring institution (UDESTRO). It is then largely up to the sindicatos to 
exercise internal controls to ensure that nobody exceeds this limit. The sindicatos are 
well positioned to do this have they have a long history of self-governing (Grisaffi, 
2013). 
Base level sindicatos carry out regular checks of coca plantations to ensure 
that all members comply with the agreement. First time offenders lose their right to 
grow coca for a year, repeat offenders lose coca-growing rights permanently and can 
be expelled from their community. These consequences are perceived by the 
community to be fair and logical. The sindicatos are serious about self-monitoring. 
Farmers claim that the controls are tighter today than when the US ‘zero coca’ 
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policies were enforced. To date more than 800 farmers have lost the right to cato 
because of non-compliance (Opinion, 2014). 
Farmers have very good reasons to self-police. For one, the policy was 
designed at the coca federation’s grassroots meetings; as a result farmers have a 
strong sense of ownership over it. Indeed farmers often refer to the accord as ‘our 
little cato,’ others say that they respect the cato because, ‘we fought for it’.   Moreover 
the farmers know that by restricting coca cultivation the price of coca goes up. Thus 
‘envidia’ or jealousy plays an important role, one farmer said, ‘look everyone knows 
how much coca I have, and they don’t want me to get rich at their expense’ as a result 
he said ‘ …they would not hesitate to denounce me.’ Finally the coca growers identify 
strongly with the goals of the MAS administration; they sincerely believe that they 
have a duty to respect the cato as a support to Morales who they know is working to 
legalize coca at the International level.  
Notwithstanding these advances, there are challenges associated with 
implementing the new policy—not least the refusal by a minority of farmers to 
comply with the regime.18 In situations where a sindicato fails to exercise adequate 
control representatives from UDESTRO negotiate with community leaders, and if 
needs be they will organize for the coca to be forcibly eradicated. However, 
eradication is no longer accompanied by violence, as one female coca leader explains 
‘we no longer rebel when they come to cut the coca – we just show them where it is 
and let them get on with their work.’  
Although community coca control is not easy, and demands constant 
negotiations with different coca growing communities, the long-term impact far 
outweighs its shortcomings. From the perspective of the Chapare coca growers, the 
new policy is a step in the right direction. The violence provoked by forced coca 
eradication is regarded as a thing of the past, and they have been able to re-establish 
themselves after years of impoverishment. Most coca growers agree that limiting coca 
cultivation is a small price to pay for peace, full citizenship and economic stability.  
Bolivia’s coca control program was not designed to limit drug trafficking, but 
there is evidence to suggest that since the launch of the cato accord the coca growers 
are now motivated to actively collaborate in the fight against drug production. Each 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Some farmers plant more than one cato on their plots, meanwhile others sub-divide or buy land in distant villages which they 
register under the name of a different family member. The federations are determined to eradicate these surplus catos (known 
locally as ‘catos blancos’ or ‘catos fantasmas’)  to ensure that each farmer has only one cato.  
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sindicato takes on the responsibility to ensure that none of its members are involved 
in processing cocaine paste. If a production site is found on a members’ plot, then the 
landowner will immediately lose their cato and potentially also their land. The profits 
derived from processing cocaine paste are so slim that most farmers are not willing to 
run this risk. Rather, they are much more likely to denounce traffickers to the police. 
As a result of this pressure, the drug workers have been forced to alter their 
behaviour, with many shifting their operations outside of the Chapare and into urban 
areas (Grisaffi, 2014a). 
 
6.2 Best practices from Bolivia 
 
The United States has been highly critical of Bolivia’s coca policy; in September 
2014 the White House renewed the ‘decertification’ of Bolivia for the seventh 
consecutive year, stating that the country had ‘failed demonstrably in the past twelve 
months to make substantial efforts to adhere to its obligations under international 
counter-narcotics agreements.’ 19  Not all evaluations have been so negative, however. 
In 2014 the European Union’s Ambassador to Bolivia explained, ‘our efforts have 
been a success; you can also see the impact in the effective and sustained reduction of 
coca production… the European Union’s experience has been very positive.’20 
Meanwhile the Organization of American States cited Bolivia’s social control 
program as an example of, ‘best practices that are not just well known but are also 
available for implementation and replication…. initiatives that enrich dialogue and 
can inspire each country to understand how it can successfully manage the various 
challenges posed by drugs within its particular context and economic, political, and 
social circumstances.’21 Thus in the final two sections the authors draw out the best 
practices from Bolivia and consider what aspects might be translated to other 
contexts.  
The Bolivian case shows that successful crop reduction is dependent on the 
state treating coca farmers as citizens and partners, rather than as criminals who 
actively stimulate the drug trade. Land-titling combined with the legal recognition of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/13/presidential-determination-major-drug-transit-and-drug-
producing-countri 
20http://www.erbol.com.bo/noticia/seguridad/17092014/ue_califica_de_exitosa_lucha_antidroga_de_bolivia,  
21http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Introduction_and_Analytical_Report.pdf 
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a limited amount of coca, can create the framework for non-repressive state 
engagement, and the protection of citizen rights. Further the Bolivian experience goes 
to illustrate that strong social organizations, with a sense of group efficacy, have to be 
permitted within a state structure and be recognized as valid counterparts in local coca 
control and development. Thus another important step is the strengthening of local 
government (including capacity building and guaranteed budget provision) to allow it 
to act upon coca grower requests. The European Union’s municipal strengthening 
program in the Chapare region is a key example in this regard.22  
National governments and their local operators also need to focus on 
providing adequate social services, such as road infrastructure, health, and education 
(basic responsibilities of all states), without conditioning them as rewards for 
eradication of coca crops.  Delinking human development from crop and drug control 
objectives is an indispensable prerequisite to establish the legitimacy of state actions 
and the trust to implement further initiatives. Control efforts will inevitably fail if 
policymakers continue to operate a system which encourages people in coca-
producing regions to perceive the government as a repressor, and not as a service 
provider.  
Finally, coca production cannot be significantly reduced without 
implementation of a viable sustainable livelihoods approach. It is common sense that 
proper sequencing is a crucial element to integrated development in coca producing 
regions. Yet, the Bolivian approach goes further, by employing subsistence income 
from coca (which has no comparable substitute in terms of income generation) as the 
anchor for unprecedented income and crop diversification.  
Coca farmers have long been subjected to externally imposed alternative 
development ‘packages’ funded by USAID in Bolivia and replicated, in spite of their 
inefficacy, in Colombia and Peru.  Thus, we recognise that it is not feasible to apply 
Bolivia’s unique home-grown strategy in other coca growing or illicit crop production 
regions, without significant modification appropriate to each context. Nevertheless, 
the community coca control initiative does present some fundamental elements that 
could be integrated into strategies applied elsewhere. 
Critics argue that key elements of Bolivia’s initiative cannot be successfully 
implemented in Peru and Colombia due to the continuing presence of violent non-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/case-studies/bolivia_praedac_en.pdf 
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state actors. Yet, in spite of the criminalization of the coca farmers and on-going 
conflict, civil society organizations exist in both countries (often organizing to resist 
state eradication efforts).23  Following the Bolivian example, the authors argue that 
rather than an impediment to coca control or ‘threat,’ these organizations and their 
members, are the key to successful implementation of coca control policies, income 
diversification programs, and ensuring the rule of law. For example the presence of 
strong social organizations in some coca growing regions of Peru, paired with a 
significant licit coca market, provide potential tools to work to implement community 
coca control. However despite platitudes to the contrary,24 Peru’s President Humala 
remains firmly committed to US funded forced eradication paired with conditioned 
development. 25 
The Colombian coca farmers meanwhile have long advocated alternative 
approaches to coca control. For example in 1994 (before the advent of aerial 
fumigation) Colombian coca farmers proposed a coca for subsistence model with 
production ceilings for community reduction. This innovative approach was rejected 
by the government,26 and coca production spiralled soon thereafter (Isacson, 2013). 
Today, in the context of on-going peace discussions between the Colombian 
government and the FARC, there appears to be some degree of political will to look 
for alternatives. For example the draft agreement on “The Solution to the Illicit Drug 
Problem” calls for voluntary crop reduction, integrated sustainable development 
initiatives, and the active participation of local communities in planning and 
execution, all features of the Bolivian model.  However, in spite of these positive 
steps, the Colombian government continues to insist on the total elimination of coca 
production and that crop ‘substitution’ is possible and viable. According to policy 
expert Ricardo Vargas, the government still perceives the FARC as its primary 
impediment to ‘total eradication’.27  
The draft version of the accord conditions development assistance and state 
engagement, on farmers meeting prior agreements for coca eradication. It puts 
timelines for compliance in place, without establishing similar deadlines for the state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Email Communication with Pedro Arenas, Observatorio de Cultivos Declarados Ilicitos. 16 November 2014. 
24 For example in June 2014 the Peruvian government sacked its drug czar, Carmen Masías, and back-pedaled on announced 
aggressive forced eradication in the Apurimac Ene Mantaro River Valley (VRAEM) due to the possibility of violence 
25 Email Communication with Ricardo Soberon, October 27, 2014. 
26 Email Communication with Pedro Arenas, Observatorio de Cultivos Declarados Ilicitos. 18 November 2014 
27 The Bolivian case provides an illustrative counter example; in Bolivia irregular groups have never been present even so over 
two decades of forced eradication failed to eliminate the entire coca crop.  
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initiative.  The accord also sets unrealistic timespans for the provision of aid that will 
guarantee subsistence until other sources of income can be implemented. The 
government proposes six months, while the FARC has suggested two years. Looking 
at the Bolivian experience the authors would suggest far longer is needed. Bolivia’s 
sustainable development initiatives took almost a decade to be consolidated, and still 
farmers are dependent on coca. In short the FARC - Government of Colombia accords 
borrow key pillars of Bolivia’s community coca control strategy, without adopting its 
indispensable cornerstones:  coca for subsistence and lack of conditionality. Without 
modification, this strategy risks falling short of its objective and justifying further 
violent forced eradication, aerial fumigation and repression. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
Peru, Colombia and Bolivian share one key dynamic, a long history of ineffectual 
violent forced eradication, criminalization of coca farmers and failed conditioned 
development.  So long as external demand for illicit drugs remains then people will 
keep growing coca because in all three nations, coca production presents a solution to 
families’ subsistence needs, which cannot be easily replaced.  Thus all that drug 
policy makers can realistically ever achieve is to affect how and where coca is grown. 
Given these parameters, if US policymakers remain committed to supply side 
initiatives then they should opt for reduced coca production with guaranteed 
subsistence as a human alternative to the myth of total eradication.  Less coca grown 
by engaged citizens who can feed their families, is preferable to continued eradication 
with the associated violence, poverty, and recurring failure. 
To reduce coca in a sustainable, effective and safe fashion the Bolivian 
experience teaches that Governments should provide basic services and infrastructure 
in compliance with their obligations to their citizens, and not as incentives for crop 
reduction. States and the international community should seek to empower grassroots 
organizations and create the conditions for their inclusion and collaboration with coca 
policy.  Finally, the international community must shift its focus and demands away 
from meaningless eradication statistics to human development indicators to measure 
progress in coca-growing regions. 
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Bolivia’s experiment with Community Coca Control opens the door for other 
countries to experiment with alternative approaches to reduce coca acreage.  The 
authors’ hope is that Peru and Colombia might adopt some of the lessons outlined 
here and integrate them into their own coca reduction efforts.  
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